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Abstract   
This paper focuses on the impact of agricultural support policies on the distribution of 
farming incomes, using measures to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects 
that are based on the change in the absolute Gini index.  The provision of support to 
Scottish agriculture is found to have been at best ineffective as a means to reduce the 
average size of income disparities between farms.  Agricultural policy is further 
shown to have been inefficient as a redistributive tool because of the adverse 
distributional effect of the re-ranking of farms induced by the provision of support. 
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1.  Introduction 
The improvement of the income position of farm households is a prominent if poorly 
defined objective of agricultural policy in many countries.  However the impact of 
farm support programmes on the distribution of income among individual farm 
households has received little explicit consideration in the agricultural economics 
literature.  Ahearn et al. (1985) and Keeney (2000) amongst others have analysed the 
contribution of farm support programmes to the total inequality of agricultural 
incomes through the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components, but 
do not thereby provide a formal characterisation of the redistributive properties of 
farm support programmes per se.  The conventional wisdom on the subject is 
summarised in OECD (2003) which argues that farm support measures do not change 
the income distribution in any significant way because farm support measures are still 
primarily based on production or production factors.  Moreover the generic nature of 
many measures implies that the bulk of support goes to farm households who do not 
need it.  OECD agricultural ministers (OECD 1998) have identified equity and 
targeting as operational criteria for policy evaluation. 
In general terms, the redistributive effect of agricultural policy may be defined 
as the difference between the inequality of pre-support and post-support farm 
household incomes.  However, the choice of inequality measure for this purpose is 
constrained by the incidence of negative farm incomes or losses, because many 
standard aggregative measure of inequality are either undefined for negative incomes 
(Amiel et al. 1996) or, if defined, do not give rise to well-behaved measures of 
redistribution if pre-support incomes are negative on average.  Allanson (2004) seeks 
to overcome the latter problem by proposing a measure of redistributive effect that is 
defined as the difference between the absolute values of the (ordinary) Gini 
coefficients of pre-support and post-support income.  This paper employs an 
alternative measure equal to the difference between the absolute Gini indices of pre-
support and post-support incomes.  This measure has the appealing property that a 
universal flat-rate payment scheme will be deemed distributionally neutral and, 
moreover, it may be decomposed to show how the distribution and scale of support 
determine the redistributive effect given the distribution of pre-support income.   
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The paper is organised as follows.  The next section introduces the measures 
that are used to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy.  Section 3 sets up the empirical application by considering the data issues 
involved in the construction of the distributions of both pre-support and post-support 
Scottish farming incomes.  Section 4 presents the empirical findings which relate to 
the effects of agricultural policy on both the inequality and stability of Scottish 
farming incomes over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  The final section offers a 
summary and some brief concluding remarks in the light of the empirical findings. 
 
2.  Measurement of redistributive effects  
Following the approach taken by Musgrave and Thin (1948) the redistributive effect 
of agricultural policy may be defined as the difference between the inequality of pre-
support and post-support farm household incomes.  But the measurement of this effect 
poses a methodological problem because of the incidence of negative farm incomes or 
losses.  Losses have often been treated as nuisance items in agricultural income 
distribution studies with one common practice being to set all negative incomes to 
zero (see, for example, Ahearn et al. 1985) even though this will obviously bias 
resultant measures of inequality (Schutz 1950).  However, negative incomes can not 
credibly be ignored in the analysis of the redistributive impact of agricultural policy 
given that many farms would record losses were it not for the provision of support and 
pre-support farm incomes may also be negative on average.   
Amiel et al. (1996) note many standard aggregative measure of inequality are 
simply undefined for negative incomes.  But even those inequality measures that are 
defined for both positive and negative incomes may not give rise to well-behaved 
measures of redistribution if pre-support incomes are negative on average.  In 
particular, relative inequality measures such as the (ordinary) Gini coefficient G, the 
relative mean deviation and the coefficient of variation, are not suitable for this 
purpose because the sign of this type of measure is determined by the sign of average 
income.  Thus if average pre-support income is negative whereas average post-support 
income is positive then the resultant measure of redistribution will be negative 
irrespective of the effect of support on inequality (see Allanson 2004, for further 
discussion).   
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One solution to this problem is to base the analysis on a measure of absolute 
inequality such as the absolute Gini index or one of the Kolm (1976a, 1976b) family 
of indices.  Absolute inequality measures have the appealing property for the study of 
farm support programmes that they are invariant to equal absolute changes to all 
incomes.  Thus a universal flat-rate payment scheme, which may be deemed to be 
distributionally neutral in the sense that all farms receive the same level of support 
regardless of pre-support incomes, will have no effect on absolute inequality.  In 
contrast, relative inequality measures are scale invariant such that a policy which 
increases all incomes in the same proportion will be deemed to have no redistributive 
effect.  But the presumed proportionality of benefits is precisely the basis of the 
widespread criticism of existing farm support programmes as poorly targeted and 
inequitable (see, inter alia, OECD 2003, Commission of the European Communities 
1991a, European Commission 2002, Oxfam 2004).  The absence of a change in 
relative inequality does not therefore provide a particularly appropriate benchmark of 
distributional neutrality for the analysis of the redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy.  
Accordingly, let R be an index of the overall redistributive effect of farm 
income support defined as the difference between the absolute Gini indices of pre-
support and post-support income, A0 and A1 respectively.  The absolute Gini index A 
is equal to half the average absolute difference between all distinct pairs of incomes in 
the population,1 but may more usefully be defined as the product of the (ordinary) 
Gini coefficient and average income.  In particular, the latter definition suggests a 
decomposition of R into ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ components along the lines of 
Kakwani (1984):  
(1) R = A0 
 – A1 = [ 0y G0 
 – 1y C1] + 1y [C1 – G1] =
  V + H  
where G0 and G1 are the (ordinary) Gini coefficients of pre-support and post-support 
income, 0y  and 1y  are the corresponding mean incomes, and C1 is the concentration 
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1A  where yi is the income of individual i (i=1,…n). 
 4
index obtained when post-support incomes are ranked by pre-support income.2  The 
‘vertical’ component V = [ 0y G0 
 – 1y C1] = – Cb b  provides a measure of the effects of 
differences in mean policy benefits between farms with different levels of pre-support 
income, which in turn depends on the distribution and scale of policy benefits where 
Cb is the concentration coefficient of benefits ranked by pre-support income3 and b is 
the mean level of benefits.  Let D = – Cb be a disparity index that is positive (negative) 
if support is progressive (regressive) in absolute terms such that mean benefit levels 
are a decreasing (increasing) function of pre-support income, and that equals zero if 
the benefit schedule is uniform.  For any given D, the gross redistributive effect of the 
policy will be proportional to the average level of benefits b .  However, the index of 
gross redistributive effect V overstates the redistributive impact of the provision of 
support because it includes the effects of changes in the ranking of farms between the 
pre-support and post-support income distributions that have no effect on overall 
inequality.  The ‘horizontal’ component H = 1y [C1 – G1] measures these re-ranking 
effects and is equal to the product of mean post-support income 1y  and the re-ranking 
index [C1 – G1] of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981).  H is non-positive by 
definition, implying that any re-ranking that does occur has a negative impact on the 
overall redistributive effect of the programme.  
The indices R, V and H may be given a normative interpretation with reference 
to the welfare measure W= ( ) AyG1y −=−  of Sen (1973).  Letting W1 be welfare in 
the post-support income distribution and WE be welfare under a hypothetical policy of 
uniform benefits equal in total value to the actual support programme, then 
(2) W1 − WE = R = V + H. 
                                                 
2 C1 is defined in relation to the concentration curve obtained by plotting the 
cumulative proportion of post-support income against the cumulative proportion of the 
population ranked by pre-support income in the same way that G is defined in relation 
to the ordinary Lorenz curve (see Lambert, 2001).  Note that C1 = G1 if the ranking of 
farms by pre-support and post-support incomes is identical. 
3 Cb is defined analogously to C1.  Note that Cb will be negative (positive) if farmers 
with low pre-support incomes receive a larger (smaller) share of support than those 
with high ones, and will equal zero for a universal flat-rate benefit. 
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Thus R, V and H can be interpreted as the monetary value of the redistributive effects 
of the policy expressed on an individual farm basis.  In particular, R represents how 
much more or less would have to be given to each farmer under the distributionally 
neutral policy of uniform benefits to yield a welfare level equal to that under the 
actual support programme.  Note that the (negative) re-ranking term H takes away 
from any welfare superiority of the actual benefit schedule over a distributionally 
neutral one.  
 
3.  Data  
To assess the redistributive effects of the provision of agricultural support in Scotland 
over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00, the distribution of farms by both pre-support and 
post-support farming income is constructed for each year using individual farm record 
data extracted from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) and raising factors 
calculated from the June Agricultural Census returns on the distribution of agricultural 
holdings in Scotland by type of farming and size of business.  The FAS is a 
representative survey of about 500 full-time commercial farms carried out each year 
on behalf of the Scottish Executive (SEERAD 2001).  It provides a wide range of 
physical and financial data, including detailed information on crop areas, livestock 
numbers, quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and costs, which allows for 
the identification of policy benefits.  Given a population of around 17,500 full-time 
farms in Scotland, the sampling fraction for each farm size and type is approximately 
3 per cent.4 
Post-support income is measured by Family Farm Income (FFI), which 
represents the return to the farm’s own capital and all unpaid labour (farmers and 
spouses, non-principal partners and directors and their spouses and family workers) 
based on the actual tenure and indebtedness of the farm business.  FFI is thus a 
measure of farm business income with the distribution of FFI per holding providing 
‘an important guide to the existence and locations of holdings generating small 
amounts of income for their occupiers’ (Hill 1991: 43).  The analysis is conducted at 
the farm level rather than per unit of unpaid labour because of doubts concerning the 
                                                 
4 The sampling frame excludes very small farms (less than 8 Economic Size Units 
(ESU)), very large specialist livestock units (greater than 200 ESU), and certain minor 
farm types. 
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relevance and reliability of data on family labour input in the UK context (see Hill 
1991).  The FAS does not provide sufficient information on either non-farm sources 
of farm household income or farm household composition to support a broader 
analysis of the distributional impact of farm income support on the overall welfare of 
the agricultural community.   
Pre-support income is defined as FFI less that part of gross policy transfers 
that is estimated to accrue to farm occupiers as owners of factors of agricultural 
production.  This approach recognises that farm occupiers may not be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of farm support programmes (Floyd 1965) and, in particular, allows for 
the effective incidence of support to vary depending on the way in which that support 
is provided (see OECD 2003: Part II).  The analysis thereby serves to identify the 
contribution of support to the inequality of post-support farming incomes, but it does 
not allow for the impact of agricultural policy on the distribution of pre-support 
incomes.  To do so would require a model of the impact on individual farm incomes 
of adjustments in both farm production choices and the state of agricultural input and 
output markets in response to agricultural policy changes.  However it seems unlikely 
that the results of such an equilibrium displacement modelling exercise would be 
robust given the magnitude of the changes that would be entailed by the complete 
abolition of support for agriculture (Gardner 1987).  
Three types of policy instrument are identified in the analysis.  First, with 
respect to market price support measures, estimates are taken from the OECD PSE 
database (OECD 2001) of the gap between the EU domestic market and border prices 
for the main agricultural commodities, measured at the farmgate level.  These 
estimates are adjusted to reflect the difference between United Kingdom (UK) and EU 
average producer prices and then used to calculate the impact of market price support 
in terms of inflating both the value (net of direct payments, grants and other subsidies) 
of observed output quantities and the cost of purchased feed and seed inputs.  Second, 
direct payments are explicitly identified in the FAS and cover payments under the 
various Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) commodity regimes, voluntary set-aside 
schemes and the UK Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances scheme.  But account 
is also taken of the implicit loss in revenues resulting from the obligatory set-aside 
requirements under the Arable Area Payments scheme (AAPS) in calculating the net 
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value of these payments.  Third, the value of other grants and subsidies includes all 
other payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent improvements.  
The net economic benefit to farmers of these transfers will depend on the 
extent to which the transfers result in increased returns to the farm-owned factors of 
production, including management, and hence in increased farming incomes.  The 
effect on farming income of a unit increase in output revenues, whether due to market 
price support, output payments or a reduction in set-aside requirements, is estimated 
as the combined cost share of the farm-owned factors of production, while that of a 
unit increase in direct payments, grants or subsidies to individual inputs (i.e. land and 
livestock) is simply calculated as the farm-owned share of those inputs.  Estimates of 
factor cost shares are obtained on the assumption that Scottish agriculture may be 
characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting 
constant returns to scale.  Allowing for fixed farm-specific and year-specific effects, 
the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function are estimated from an 
unbalanced panel of observations formed from the FAS samples for 1995/96 through 
1999/00 (Roberts et al. 2002).  This yields shares for total labour, land and buildings, 
livestock capital, and all other purchased inputs of 15.2%, 9.5%, 8.6%, and 41.4% 
respectively.  With these attributable costs accounting for 74.8% of total revenue, the 
residual 25.2% is identified as the return to the farmer’s (fixed) management input.  
Farm-owned shares of factors of production are derived for each farm in the FAS 
sample, with 78.7% of labour, 58.1% of land and buildings and 100% of livestock 
capital being supplied on average by farm occupiers in the full raised sample.  Hence 
the average net benefit to farmers of an extra £1 of market price support or output-
related payments; AAPS or other area-related payments; livestock headage payments, 
subsidies or grants; and purchased input subsidies would have been £0.513, £0.581, 
£1 and £0 respectively. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study, which relate to the effects of 
agricultural policy on both the inequality and stability of Scottish farming incomes 
over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  Table 1 presents weighted summary statistics by 
year for Scottish agriculture.  Average FFI per farm was positive throughout the 
period, but fell sharply in 1997/98 as a result of a marked decline in total output and 
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had not recovered by 1999/00.  In contrast, the total value of support was roughly 
constant in spite of the changing balance of support between direct payments and 
market price support during the phased introduction of the MacSharry reforms 
(Commission of the European Communities 1991b).  Direct payments provided the 
main source of support throughout the period, with 1993/94 marking the start of the 
introduction of the MacSharry reforms and 1995/96 their full implementation.  Market 
price support was also significant with domestic producer prices for most 
commodities remaining well above corresponding world price levels in spite of the 
reduction in agricultural support prices between 1993/94 and 1995/96, though 
characteristically exhibiting greater variability than the other sources of support due to 
the effects of variation both in output levels and in domestic and world market 
conditions.   
The total value of support exceeded FFI throughout the period, although 
farmers would not in practice have received the full benefit of these transfers due to 
leakages to other owners of factors of agricultural production.  Allowing for these 
leakages, the total impact of agricultural support on average family farm income is 
estimated to have been between £25000 and £31000 per year rather than between 
£35000 and £41000.  Average pre-support incomes are thus predicted to have been 
close to zero in the years up to 1996/97, but to have fallen sharply thereafter with 
losses of more than £15000 recorded in each of the three years 1997/98 through 
1999/00.  The chronic dependence of farming on state aid is highlighted by the finding 
that in no year would less than half of all farms have recorded pre-support losses, and 
nearly 90% would have done so in the latter years of the period.  
Table 2 presents the main findings of the study.  Absolute inequality in post-
support farm incomes is shown to have been substantial with the average absolute 
income differential between farms comparable in size to average income levels prior 
to 1997/98 and roughly twice as large thereafter.  In comparison, the distribution of 
pre-support income initially exhibited lower levels of absolute inequality, but levels 
were similar in the latter years of the period.  The provision of support thus increased 
the average size of income differentials prior to 1997/98, as indicated by the negative 
values of the index of net redistributive effect R, but thereafter had a broadly neutral 
effect on absolute inequality with the value of R approximately equal zero.  In the first
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Table1.  Weighted Summary Statistics, 1993/94-1999/00. 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Total farm output 98434 107111 112834 112143 95713 95294 93851
Total farm input 80424 85703 89789 92163 90893 90445 89903
(Post-support) FFI (£/farm) 23856 27645 28903 26790 11504 11921 11656
% of farms with post-support FFI<0 7% 9% 8% 7% 25% 26% 24%
Total transfers  (£/farm) 35348 37725 39757 38620 36983 40728 40132
Of which due to:-   Market price support 18312 18325 16025 10409 11633 13514 14216
(Net) direct payments 15306 17317 21618 26045 23931 25625 23699
Other grants and subsidies 1730 2082 2114 2167 1419 1589 2217
Total net benefit to farmers (£/farm) 25876 27144 29117 29934 27476 30876 30119
Of which due to:-   Market price support 9855 9742 8504 5341 5923 7132 7637
(Net) direct payments 14436 15492 18787 22874 20446 22493 20724
Other grants and subsidies 1585 1910 1826 1718 1107 1252 1758
As % of post-support FFI: 108% 98% 101% 112% 239% 259% 258%
Pre-support FFI (£/farm) -2020 501 -214 -3144 -15972 -18955 -18464
% of farms with pre-support FFI<0 57% 61% 63% 61% 86% 87% 87%
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2.  The Redistributive Effects of Agricultural Support Policy, 1993/94-1999/00 
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Absolute Gini index for post-support FFI A1 12089 16791 16015 14473 11397 11931 10950
Absolute Gini index for pre-support FFI A0 9274 14069 12581 11953 11361 13646 11165
Index of redistributive effect R −2815 −2721 −3434 −2520 −36 1715 215
Index of vertical redistribution V 1991 1370 1624 2961 5002 6888 5824
Of which due to:   Market price support -1713 -1521 -1450 -712 -68 404 347
(Net) direct payments 3499 3242 3539 3927 4859 6264 5286
Other grants and subsidies 205 -351 -465 -254 211 220 191
Index of re-ranking    H −4806 −4091 −5058 −5482 −5038 −5173 −5609
Disparity of net benefits:  Total support D 0.077 0.050 0.056 0.099 0.182 0.223 0.193
Market price support −0.174 −0.156 −0.171 −0.133 −0.011 0.057 0.045
(Net) direct payments 0.242 0.209 0.188 0.172 0.238 0.278 0.255
Other grants and subsidies 0.130 −0.184 −0.255 −0.148 0.191 0.176 0.109
Average net benefits:  Total support b 25876 27144 29117 29934 27476 30876 30119
Of which due to:   Market price support 9855 9742 8504 5341 5923 7132 7637
(Net) direct payments 14436 15492 18787 22874 20446 22493 20724
Other grants and subsidies 1585 1910 1826 1718 1107 1252 1758
Average post-support FFI 1y 23856 27645 28903 26790 11504 11921 11656
Atkinson-Plotnick re-ranking index  C1−G1 −0.201 −0.148 −0.175 −0.205 −0.438 −0.434 −0.481
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 11
period, the negative redistributive impact of agricultural policy was such as to 
increase average income disparities by between 20 and 30 per cent.  
The decomposition of R reveals the factors underlying these outcomes.  The 
first point to note is that the disparity index D is consistently positive, implying that 
farmers with negative or low pre-support incomes received more than an equal share 
of total benefits (although their share of benefits was less than their share of overall 
losses).  This finding may appear surprising in the light of the commonplace 
observation that support is largely proportionate to the volume of production (see, for 
example, Commission of the European Communities 1991a).  However both total 
transfers and net benefits are negatively correlated with pre-support incomes given 
that the observed structure of farming would have been neither financially nor 
economically viable were it not for the provision of support.   
Hence the gross redistributive effect of agricultural policy was consistently 
positive as indicated by the index of vertical redistribution V.  The increase in vertical 
redistribution over the period is attributable to both the increasing scale of average net 
benefits and the more progressive distribution of those benefits.  In particular, the 
partial switch from price support measures to direct aid payments as a result of the 
MacSharry reforms is seen to have had a beneficial impact given both the higher 
transfer efficiency and more progressive distribution of the latter.  Keeney (2000) has 
previously shown for Irish agriculture that the payment of direct aids following the 
MacSharry reforms led to a more equal distribution of family farm incomes (in 
relative terms) than would otherwise have been the case.   
However the gross redistributive effect was more than offset by the re-ranking 
effect, as measured by the index H, except in the final years of the period when the 
two effects roughly cancelled each other out.  By implication, agricultural policy 
would have reduced the degree of absolute inequality in the distribution of farm 
income had not the ranking of farms been altered by the provision of support.  
Alternatively the average level of annual support could have been cut by about £5000 
per farm with no effect on welfare if it had been possible to eliminate the horizontal 
inequities arising from the re-ranking of farms in the income distribution.  These 
findings provide some of the first evidence that the re-ranking effect is too important 
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for it not to be taken into account in the consideration of the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy.  
The results presented in Table 2 are based on a ‘static’ analysis with the degree 
of inequality and redistribution observed in any particular year influenced not only by 
underlying long-run factors but also by random factors affecting the incomes of 
individual farms in that year.  For example, in the extreme case, the long run income 
of all farms might be equal but, because in each year different farms have good or bad 
luck, observed farm income in each year may be very unequal.  Conversely, the 
observed inequality may be entirely due to differences in permanent income between 
farms if transitory shocks are perfectly correlated across farms.  Clearly, the two 
scenarios have very different implications for the design of agricultural policy with 
the first calling for short-term assistance to deal with transitory problems of low or 
negative incomes on individual farms and the second requiring action to deal with the 
structural problems that trap some farms in low or negative incomes.   
We consider here the impact of agricultural support policy on the stability of 
farm incomes by exploiting the longitudinal information on individual farms in the 
FAS panel.  To measure the stability of income and support levels, we calculate a 
stability index in the spirit of Shorrocks (1978), which may be defined for any income 
or support variable X over a measurement period of T years as the ratio of the T-year 
Absolute Gini index of X, calculated using each farm’s average value of X over the T-
year period, to the average of the T annual values of the Absolute Gini index of X.  
The index will equal zero when income or support levels are exactly equalised over 
the measurement period in which case the T-year Absolute Gini index is equal to zero, 
and will equal unity when all absolute income or support differentials between 
individual farms remain constant through time in which case the Absolute Gini index 
for each year and for the measurement period as a whole will be the same.5  Hence if 
inequality is largely a short-run phenomenon due to transitory shocks then the index 
                                                 
5 From Shorrocks (1978), it follows that  
∑∑
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=≤=
T
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ttTTT AT
1GX
T
1GXA , 
where AT , GT  and TX  are the T-year Absolute Gini index,  Gini coefficient and mean 
value of X respectively, and  At, Gt  and tX  are the corresponding annual values in 
year t.  Hence the stability index must lie in the closed unit interval 
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will take a value close to zero whereas if inequality largely arises from long-term 
differences between farms then the index will take a value close to unity. 
The stability analysis is restricted to a balanced panel of 336 farms for which 
FAS data are available for all seven of the years 1993/94 to 1999/00.6  Table 3 reports 
the values of the stability index and constituent annual average and T-year absolute 
Gini indices for the various measures of income and support employed in the study 
over progressively longer measurement periods commencing in 1993/94.  The 
stability indices are seen to all equal unity when T=1, since the one-year absolute Gini 
index is simply the absolute Gini for 1993/94.  In all other cases, T-year inequality is 
less than the average level of annual inequality, due to the process of averaging over 
time, and the values of the indices are less than unity.  Figure 1 plots the values of the 
stability indices against T to more clearly illustrate the nature of the relationship 
between them for the different measures of income and support. 
We note first that the stability index for total support does not drop below 0.97 
indicating that the inequality of benefits observed in any one year almost entirely 
reflects permanent differences in eligibility between farms.  The stability of (net) 
direct payments might have been expected given that eligibility for many direct 
payments is based on quasi-fixed factors of production and restricted by historical 
production levels and/or possession of relevant quotas.  More surprising is that the 
distribution of market price support appears no less stable over time given that the 
benefits of market intervention to individual farms will have been subject to 
commodity-specific fluctuations in both output levels and world market conditions.  
Only the distribution of other grants and subsidy appears to have been subject to any 
significant degree of variability, perhaps due to shifting patterns of participation in a 
changing miscellany of voluntary schemes. 
The results further suggest that the provision of support stabilises farm 
incomes to some extent given that the stability index for post-support income lies 
consistently above that for pre-support incomes.  In particular, the initial decline in the 
stability index for post-support income is more gradual than that for pre-support 
                                                 
6 There are 345 farms with data for all seven years.  Of these farms, nine are dropped 
to ensure that the there is no representation of large LFA cattle farms large cereals 
farms, and medium lowland mixed cattle & sheep farms in any year (note that farms 
may change both their size and type over time). 
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Table 3.  Stability of Income and Support Levels, 1993/94-1999/00  
Measurement period 93/94 93/94 
to 
94/95
93/94 
to 
95/96
93/94 
to 
96/97
93/94 
to 
97/98 
93/94 
to 
98/99 
93/94 
to 
99/00
T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Average annual absolute Gini index 
Post-support income 11678 12422 13408 13395 12908 12677 12252
Pre-support income 8057 9242 10107 10382 10356 10809 10733
Total support 9319 9533 9862 10124 10080 10161 10164
Market price support 5794 5802 5690 5483 5279 5129 4995
(Net) direct payments 6420 6469 6906 7414 7484 7728 7793
Other grants & subs. 911 967 972 989 933 907 920
 T-year absolute Gini index 
Post-support income 11678 11627 12344 12130 11377 10912 10389
Pre-support income 8057 8382 9007 9086 8815 9098 8974
Total support 9319 9395 9721 9892 9839 9913 9902
Market price support 5794 5774 5650 5334 5111 4968 4830
(Net) direct payments 6420 6367 6803 7235 7302 7561 7619
Other grants & subs. 911 922 916 920 856 823 831
 Stability Index 
Post-support income 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.85
Pre-support income 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.84
Total support 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Market price support 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
(Net) direct payments 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Other grants & subs. 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 1.  Stability of income and support measures. 
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transitory shocks to pre-support incomes.  Nevertheless, the subsequent convergence 
of the two stability indices as the measurement period increases suggests that the 
support system does little to remedy the underlying, structural determinants of 
inequality.  Levels of long-run or structural inequality would appear to be about 85% 
of annual inequality, with Table 3 implying a long-run value for the absolute Gini 
index of roughly £9000.   
 
5  Conclusions 
The principal focus of the paper is the measurement of the redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy.  One possible criticism of such an exercise is that the distribution 
of agricultural policy transfers reflects goals other than income support, such as those 
to do with the environment, sustainability and rural development.  However measures 
specifically targeted to these other objectives still only account for a relatively small 
share of total support, whereas the direct payments that were first introduced by the 
MacSharry reforms of the CAP and now account for the bulk of support, had the 
stated objective of compensating farmers for the adverse income effects of cuts in 
support prices.  The European Commission has for many years expressed concerns 
about the inequitable distribution of income support (Commission of the European 
Communities 1991a, European Commission 1997, 2002) and in the recent Mid Term 
Review of Agenda 2000 made various proposals to improve the targeting of direct 
payments (European Commission 2002, 2003).  
The redistributive effect of agricultural policy is measured as the difference 
between the absolute Gini indices of pre-support and post-support incomes.  This is a 
measure of the change in absolute inequality, which provides a benchmark of 
distributional neutrality more in accord with both public and official perceptions of 
fairness in the distribution of agricultural support than one based on the concept of 
relative inequality.  The measure may be interpreted as the monetary value per farm of 
the change in inequality due to the provision of support.  Moreover it may be 
decomposed into a vertical redistribution effect and a horizontal re-ranking 
component, and thus serves not only to quantify but also to characterise the 
redistributive effect of agricultural policy.   
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The measure is used to explore the effects of agricultural policy on the 
distribution of Scottish farm incomes over the period 1993/94 to 1999/00.  It is found 
that the provision of support increased the average size of farm income differentials 
prior to 1997/98, but thereafter had a broadly neutral effect on absolute inequality.  
Nevertheless, the vertical stance of agricultural policy is shown to have consistently 
been progressive in absolute terms with the average level of benefit decreasing with 
the level of pre-support incomes.  And it is only because of the adverse distributional 
effects of the re-ranking of farms that the provision of income support did not in fact 
reduce absolute inequality.  Finally, the provision of support appears to have buffered 
farm incomes from the effects of transitory shocks to some extent, but does not seem 
to have remedied the underlying structural factors that are the major cause of the 
inequality observed in any particular year. 
In sum, the operation of agricultural policy in Scotland was at best ineffective 
as a redistributive tool.  This comes as little surprise in the light of the existing 
literature on the subject.  But what is found in this study adds to such conventional 
wisdom the observation that agricultural policy was also inefficient as a redistributive 
tool because of the negative effect of the re-ranking induced by the provision of 
support.  One possible cause of this horizontal inequity is the organisation of the CAP 
on a commodity basis, with the level of support varying across commodities.  
However this may not be the main factor given that results from a disaggregated 
analysis by farm type (not reported) show that the re-ranking index H for the 
agricultural sector as a whole is not consistently higher than the comparable indices 
for individual farm types.7  The more fundamental problem is that eligibility for 
support is contingent on current and/or historical levels of outputs and/or inputs rather 
than being determined on some means-tested basis.  The targeting of support to those 
that agricultural policy-makers might deem to warrant assistance will remain a highly 
imperfect process so long as this is the case.  
 
                                                 
7 Allanson (2005) provides further evidence in support of this conclusion. 
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